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 Summary 
The crisis of September and October 2006 between Georgia and Russia has made evident 
two things for Europe: Firstly, the EU may find itself confronted with war in its new 
neighborhood sooner than it imagines. Secondly, there is now a ‘window of opportunity’ 
for Brussels to enhance and reposition itself in the region in order to attend to its inter-
ests. 
The ‘window of opportunity’ has opened up for the EU because Georgian President 
Mikheil Saakashvili, who has given the impression that Europe is not as important to his 
country as his big protection power of the USA, now turns to Europe. In order to gain 
‘Western’ solidarity, he has applied a strategy of fueling the conflict with Moscow in order 
to incite excessive reactions, as displayed in the publicly played-out arrest of four Russian 
military officers for charges of espionage. Russia’s subsequent response was harsh, impos-
ing the most severe boycott measures since the 1948 Berlin Blockade against Tbilisi. How-
ever, even though the international community has been astonished by Moscow’s meas-
ures, Saakashvili has miscalculated. In fact, Saakashvili’s administration has had to learn 
the lesson that there are indeed more important issues for Washington. On October 13, 
the USA made a deal with Russia, passing a Moscow-sponsored resolution ‘against’ Tbilisi 
in exchange for a Washington-sponsored North Korea resolution. Furthermore, NATO 
has as yet failed to offer Tbilisi an action plan for membership – an offer that Georgia had 
hoped to receive with US-support at the NATO summit in Riga (Latvia) in November 
2006. 
As the recent crisis between Georgia and Russia is closely connected to Georgia’s ‘fro-
zen’ secession conflicts with Moscow-supported South Ossetia and Abkhazia – one of 
which is striving for an integration with Russia, the other for associated relations – Brus-
sels now finds itself at a point where it has to decide what role it should play in Georgia in 
order to attend to its interests, especially with regard to conflict resolution. Despite the 
fact that the UN- and OSCE-led negotiation mechanisms have so far failed to produce 
final settlements and their engagements could not avert increased tensions with the break-
away regions, this report does not argue in favor of a stronger conflict resolution role for 
the EU with its image as an ‘honest broker’. It rather makes the point that it is not in 
Brussels’ interest to get directly involved in the negotiation processes due to the ‘frozen’ 
nature of the secession conflicts. There is no chance for constructively ‘unfreezing’ the 
conflicts in the short-term and, therefore, there is also no specific added value of a direct 
EU involvement. But in the long-term, confidence-building is the most reasonable direct 
strategy with regard to conflict resolution and represents a task that both the UN and the 
OSCE are already committed to. The EU has the financial means to support these efforts – 
something Brussels has increasingly been doing of late. 
The paper proposes the EU sticks to the instruments already at its disposal and applies 
them more coherently instead of creating new ones. In 2003, the EU appointed a Special 
Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and strengthened his mandate in 2006 
after the first office holder used his position to take a relatively active role in the conflicts. 
Notwithstanding the fact that it would be desirable to further increase the EUSR’s visibil-
 
 ity and presence in Georgia with regard to the breakaway regions, due to their ‘frozen’ 
nature, the conflicts do not represent reasonable starting points in order to break Geor-
gia’s ‘vicious circle’ of state fragility. This state fragility not only refers to the secession 
conflicts, but also to weak and inefficient institutions, a lack of the rule of law as well as to 
corruption. In fact, it would make more sense for the EU to strengthen the Georgian state 
by assisting in institution- and capacity-building and by promoting good governance and 
the rule of law. This would help Georgia to become more attractive to South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia than integration with the Russian Federation. The promotion of good govern-
ance not only is something that the EU, in reference to its experiences with enlargement, 
has a good record in, it is also an aspect that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
has put a lot of emphasis on. Georgia’s individual ENP Action Plan has just recently been 
formally approved at the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council session on November 14. 
Since governance will also be a focus of the upcoming German Council Presidency in the 
first half of 2007, Berlin could add momentum to this approach. 
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 1. Introduction: Europe’s New Neighborhood  
on the Verge of War1
In Europe’s new neighborhood, September and October 2006 witnessed an escalation of 
the recurring ‘war of words’ between Georgia and Russia to the verge of a military con-
frontation. These events have unfolded while Germany prepares for her G8 and Council 
of the European Union presidencies in 2007 and while consultations on the individual 
Action Plan with Tbilisi were being finalized with regard to the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP)2. It was not until after the European Security Strategy had been adopted in 
December 2003 that the countries of the South Caucasus were recommended for and 
included in the ENP. By seeking a ring of well-governed countries around the European 
Union (EU), the ENP is aimed at avoiding what the EU has of late almost been faced with 
– instability on its borders.3
The recent crisis was triggered by the arrest of four Russian military officers on charges 
of espionage in Georgia on September 27. Instead of quietly turning them over to their 
home country, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has used this incident as a populist 
provocation in order to trigger a strong reaction from Russia, thereby gaining ‘Western’ 
support. And indeed, Duma President Boris Gryslov, subsequently, has threatened with a 
military option, saying that the proceeding of the Georgian leadership was considered to 
be an act of state terrorism and, therefore, all measures provided for by the Russian legis-
lation in the fight against terrorism were applicable against Georgia.4 Russian troops in 
Georgia went on alert. The accused spies were released and handed over to the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on October 2, after OSCE Chair-
man-in-Office Karel De Gucht held talks with Saakashvili in Tbilisi. Nevertheless, Russia – 
after recalling her ambassador to Georgia – has imposed sanctions, representing the most 
severe boycott measures since the Berlin Blockade of 1948. These add to the ban on Geor-
gian wine and mineral water imposed in January 2006, and include the suspension of all 
air, rail, car, and sea traffic as well as of postal communications between the two 
neighboring countries. Furthermore, hundreds of Georgians living in Russia have been 
 
 
1 This report represents the second publication in the context of a research project on external democracy 
promotion by international organizations, conducted at PRIF. The author thanks her interview partners at 
the European Union in Brussels for helpful information, the members of PRIF’s research group, Interna-
tional Organization, Democratic Peace and the Rule of Law, as well as Susanne Fischer, Hans-Joachim 
Schmidt, Tabea Seidler, and Heidrun Zinecker for valuable comments, and the Friedrich Ebert foundation 
for financial support. 
2 The visiting delegation of the EU Troika and Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili signed a joint 
statement on the agreed text of the Georgia-EU Action Plan within the ENP on October 2. The Action Plan 
has been formally approved at the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council session in Brussels on November 14. 
In regard to the ENP see below, page 26. 
3 Cf. Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 8 and European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy 
Paper, Brussels, 12 May 2004, p. 5. 
4 Since July 2006, according to her Constitution, Russia – when threatened – has the right to apply military 
means abroad in order to stop “international terrorist activities”. 
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forcibly repatriated to Tbilisi for alleged visa violations, accompanied by the closure of 
various Georgian-owned businesses in Russia. Impoverished Georgia not only depends on 
the money sent by approximately one million Georgians working in Russia, but also on 
the import of Russian gas. Consequently, the Duma has proposed amendments to existing 
legislation that would enable the stoppage of money transfers in emergency situations, 
and – according to Georgia – Russian gas monopolist Gazprom has discussed raising the 
gas price from 86.50 euro to 135 to 200 euro (per 1000 m³) in 2007. 
Relations between the two neighbors have always been sensitive after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of Georgia in 1991. The backdrop for 
recurring tensions are Georgia’s ‘frozen conflicts’5 with the two de-facto independent 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia that are supported by Russia.6 Russia 
has, in this context, followed a strategy of ‘controlled instability’7 or ‘frozen uncertainty’8, 
thereby obstructing the development of Georgia’s sovereignty and statehood. The seces-
sion conflicts are part of a vicious circle of state fragility that Georgia faces. On the one 
hand, the Georgian state is weakened by the secession conflicts, i.e. the fact that Tbilisi 
does not control around 15 per cent of Georgia’s territory, which also has economic be-
sides security-related implications. On the other hand, the fact that the Georgian state is 
already weakened by carrying the Soviet heritage and Shevardnadze’s legacy (endemic 
corruption, clientelistic state structures, inefficient political institutions, and a lack of the 
rule of law), enables the perpetuation of the shadow economy and smuggling that flour-
ishes especially in South Ossetia. This, in turn, fosters the interests of conflict entrepre-
neurs to maintain the status quo.9 But ever since the ‘Rose Revolution’10 of November 2003 
that brought into power a strongly ‘Western’-oriented administration under US-educated 
President Saakashvili, the atmosphere between Tbilisi and Moscow has consistently dete-
riorated, apart from a short period of thaw in 2004. Saakashvili has eloquently taken any 
opportunity to provoke his northern neighbor, e.g. by demonstratively supporting the 
‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine late in 2004 and publicly considering to leave the Com-
 
 
5 Kalevi Holsti used the term of ‘frozen conflicts’ in order to describe the result of a philosophical dilemma: 
“[...] you cannot force communities to live together – particularly communities that believe their physical 
survival is at stake – but you cannot separate them either. The conflict becomes frozen rather than settled. 
This is not conflict resolution; it is conflict perpetuation.” Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of 
War. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1996, p. 196. 
6 The secession conflicts that are background for the recurring tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow will be 
described in more detail in chapter 0 starting on page 5. 
7 Martina Bielawski and Uwe Halbach, Der georgische Knoten - Die Südossetien-Krise im Kontext geor-
gisch-russischer Beziehungen, Berlin (SWP), 2004, p 7. 
8 Oksana Antonenko, Frozen Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia, in: Bruno Coppieters and 
Robert Legvold (eds.), Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, Cambridge (American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences), 2005, pp. 205-269. 
9 Cf. Pamela Jawad, Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the “Rose Revolution”? PRIF Reports No. 73, 
Frankfurt, 2005, p. 36 f. 
10 The term ‘Rose Revolution’ represents the November 2003 events in Georgia, that, after public protest 
against fraudulent parliamentary election, resulted in former President Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation 
and Saakashvili’s subsequent victory with 96 per cent of the votes in the January 2004 presidential elections. 
Regarding the ‘Rose Revolution’ and its consequences, see ibid. 
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monwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Russia’s disapproval is especially 
caused by Georgia’s struggle for NATO membership11, which has been strongly supported 
by the USA12. The latter is reason enough for Russian President Vladimir Putin to polem-
ize against Saakashvili’s ‘foreign sponsors’ interfering in the hegemon’s ‘near abroad’, or 
for Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov to indirectly blame the USA and NATO for the 
recent crisis. 
The deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations is closely interconnected with a per-
ceived escalation of security dilemmas in the secession conflicts (see section 0, pages 5 ff.). 
On the one hand, the centers of the breakaway regions, Sukhumi (Abkhazia) and Tshkin-
vali (South Ossetia), feel threatened by Tbilisi’s rapid armament, that, in connection with 
harsh tones by members of the Georgian government, are interpreted as improving prem-
ises for a military option of conflict ‘resolution’. On the other hand, with growing mis-
trust, an increasing military-political cooperation between the de facto states, and a 
stealthy “annexation”13 by a growing economic dependency on Russia and a ‘Russifica-
tion’ via the distribution of Russian passports14, the realization of Saakashvili’s inaugura-
tion promise to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity becomes increasingly unobtainable. 
The present situation of mutual threats and references to the willingness of the respec-
tive opponent to resort to arms could not be averted by international engagement in the 
conflict zones. More than a decade after the ceasefire agreements that followed the violent 
outbreak of the early 1990s, negotiations led by the OSCE in South Ossetia and the United 
Nations (UN) in Abkhazia have as yet failed to produce negotiated settlements. In the 
recent crisis, both Russia and Georgia have repeatedly called on the international com-
munity in the shape of the UN and the OSCE to intervene on their behalf.15 But, with both 
 
 
11 Georgia even considers NATO membership to be a short-term target. In his annual presidential address to 
Parliament on 14 February 2006, Saakashvili stated that “Georgia is one step away from NATO member-
ship. […] [I]n 2008 Georgia and Ukraine […] have a very good chance of becoming full members of 
NATO.”, http://president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&st=30&id=1450 (accessed in 10/2006). 
12 Hardliners of the Republican Party’s right wing in the US Senate even collect signatures in order to acceler-
ate Georgia’s accession to NATO; cf. Uwe Klußmann, Kalter Krieg im Kaukasus, 3 October 2006, in:  
www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,440557,00.html (accessed in 10/2006). 
13 In an address to the UN General Assembly on September 22, Saakashvili said that “the painful, but factual 
truth is that these regions [Abkhazia and South Ossetia; P.J.] are being annexed by our neighbor to the 
north – the Russian Federation […].” United Nations Association of Georgia, Georgia: Saakashvili unveils 
‘fresh’ roadmap in UN speech, 22 September 2006, in: www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EKOI- 
6TY49H?OpenDocument (accessed in 10/2006). 
14 South Ossetia’s de facto foreign minister claims that close to 90 per cent of all Ossetians in South Ossetia 
have become Russian citizens, cited in International Crisis Group, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, 
Europe Report No. 159, Tbilisi/Brussels, 26 November 2004, p. 7. 
15 In this context, Russia has called on the UN Security Council to censure Georgia for its conduct in the 
arrest of the four Russian officers. Putin has sent a letter to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office thanking him for 
his mediation in the release of the Russian officers and, at the same time, asking him to push for a funda-
mental policy change in Georgia. Saakashvili stated that his government was thinking about bringing the 
case of the forcible repatriation of Georgians (in cargo planes) and Russia’s alleged human rights violations 
of deportees’ before the European Court of Human Rights. Georgia’ ambassador at the Council of Europe 
(CoE), Zurab Tchiaberashvili, has asked the international community to push for Russia’s mitigation, say-
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the UN Security Council and the OSCE being ‘blocked’ by Russia – in one case due to 
Russia’s veto-power as a permanent member16, in the other due to the consensus princi-
ple17 – this report takes a closer look at another international actor: the European Union 
(EU). 
The recent adoption of the ENP Action Plan on November 14 as well as Germany’s 
upcoming Council Presidency18 hold the opportunity for the EU to enhance and reposi-
tion itself in the region, especially with regard to conflict resolution. What role should the 
EU play in Georgia? On the one hand, Brussels has, since 1999, emphasized the primary 
importance of conflict settlement for external assistance to be effective in the South Cau-
casus19 and, lately, has proclaimed its intention to become more engaged in conflict reso-
lution20. Moreover, in the face of the complex geo-strategic environment, dominated by a 
‘tug-of-war’ between the Russian Federation and the USA, the EU, compared to other 
international actors, has the advantage of being perceived as “an ‘honest broker’ free from 
traditional US/Russia rivalries”21 by the conflict parties. But on the other hand, Saakashvili 
– with the USA as protecting power – has so far given the impression that Europe is not so 
important to him and his country. Despite the fact that Europeans and US-Americans 
alike have called on Moscow to put an end to her excessive proceeding, Saakashvili has 
miscalculated. His strategy of fueling the conflicts with Russia and the breakaway regions 
in order to gain ‘Western’ solidarity has failed. The USA has apparently abandoned Sa-
akashvili to some extent. Thus, she made a deal with Russia and passed a Russia-
sponsored UN Security Council Resolution on October 13, condemning Georgia’s troop 
advancement to the Abkhazian border, while Russia agreed to an US-sponsored resolu-
tion on North Korea one day later. Furthermore, NATO only offers an ‘intensified dia-
logue’ instead of an action plan to membership that Tbilisi had expected from the NATO 
 
 
 
ing that there was a Cold War in the Caucasus that could develop into a hot war threatening peace and se-
curity in the region. 
16 Regarding a recent UN Security Council Resolution of 13 October 2006, Russia rejected an earlier resolu-
tion on Georgia arguing that the USA had amended the document without consulting with Security Coun-
cil members; cf. Molly Corso, Both Moscow and Tbilisi claim UN Resolution a “victory”, 16 October 2006, 
in: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101606a.shtml (accessed in 10/2006). However, 
Moscow finally made a deal with Washington on the aforesaid resolution (see below, pages 4 and 12). 
17 Cf. Peter Schlotter, The OSCE’s Contribution to “Democratic Peace” – 30 Years of the Helsinki Final Act, 
in: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2005, Vol. 11, Baden-Baden (Nomos), 2006, pp. 61-68, here: 67. 
18 Regarding Germany’s relations to Georgia and her upcoming Council Presidency see page 16 and footnote 
69. 
19 Cf. General Affairs Council, 21-22 June 1999, Press 198 No. 9008/99 as well as Dov Lynch, Security Sector 
Governance in the Southern Caucasus – Towards an EU Strategy, in: Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (ed.), Security Sector Governance in the Southern Caucasus: Challenges 
and Visions, Geneva (DCAF), 2004, pp. 34-47, here: 42. 
20 Cf. General Affairs Council Conclusions, Brussels, 26-27 February 2001; also see below, page 15 ff. 
21 International Crisis Group, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Europe Report 
No. 173, Tbilisi/Brussels, 20 March 2006, p. i. 
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summit in Riga in late November 2006. The Saakashvili administration now turns to 
Europe.22
Europe, indeed, has some important interests that are at stake in Georgia. In order to 
assess how the EU should attend to these interests that are analyzed in section 0 (see pages 
13 ff.), this report will review the EU activities in Georgia since the early 1990s in section 0 
(see pages 18 ff.). It will evaluate whether the EU’s own cognition of the importance of 
conflict settlement for assistance to be effective has been translated into corresponding 
action after 1999 (see section 0, pages 28 ff.) and argue in favor of the EU’s ‘soft approach’ 
to conflict resolution via the promotion of good governance in the conclusion (see section 
0, pages 30 ff.). After all, the secession conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that will 
be treated in the following section (see pages 5 ff.) represent only one aspect of the vicious 
circle of state fragility that Georgia faces with regard to serious deficits in the security, 
legitimacy/rule of law and welfare functions of a state.23
2. Territorial Disintegration in Georgia 
Under Soviet rule, more autonomous units were built up in Georgia (Georgian: Sakart-
welo) than in any other Soviet republic (with the exception of Russia).24 No other state in 
the post-Soviet area has as many difficulties in securing or restoring territorial integrity or 
in controlling its territory as Georgia.25 This, for one thing, concerns parts of the country 
that do not strive for secession but nevertheless are or were out of Tbilisi’s control.26 How-
 
 
22 This ‘turning to Europe’ was for example expressed by Georgia’s Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili in an 
interview in which he stated that “Europe must not leave Georgia alone anymore, like it did in 1921, when 
the Red Army occupied Georgia, destroying her independence after only three years.” Cited in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 November 2006, p. 7 [translated by P.J.]. 
23 For an assessment of Georgia’s failing state see e.g. Coppieters and Legvold (eds.) 2005, see above (footnote 
8); Uwe Halbach, Georgien: Staatsversagen als Folge von Korruption und territorialer Desintegration, in: 
Ulrich Schneckener (ed.), States at Risk. Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, Berlin 
(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), 2004, pp. 105-121; Martina Huber, State-building in Georgia. Unfin-
ished and at Risk? Den Haag (Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”), 2004. Re-
garding the three ‘state functions’, ‘dimensions’ or ‘tasks’ in general, see e.g. Francis Fukuyama, State-
building: the new agenda, Ithaca, NY (Cornell University Press), 2004; Dieter Grimm (ed.), Staatsaufgaben, 
Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1996; Jennifer Milliken/Keith Krause, State Failure, State Collapse and 
State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies, in: Jennifer Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse 
and Reconstruction, Oxford et al. (Blackwell), 2003. 
24 For the general role of Soviet nationality policy in the recurrence of national movements in the late 1980s or 
its effect on the relationships between different communities see particularly Rexane Dehdashti, Interna-
tionale Organisationen als Vermittler in innerstaatlichen Konflikten. Die OSZE und der Berg Karabach-
Konflikt, Frankfurt am Main (Campus), 2000, pp. 26-36. 
25 Cf. Darrell Slider, Democratization in Georgia, in: Karen Dawish and Bruce Parrott (eds.), Democratization 
and Authoritarianism in Postcommunist Societies, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1997, p. 169. 
26 Isolated parts of the country such as the northern valleys of Svaneti and Pankisi, the inhabitants of which 
are of Chechen descent, or regions in the south predominantly inhabited by Armenian and Azeri minorities 
which reject the notion of being part of Georgia, e.g. the Armenian enclave of Javakheti. The southwestern 
republic of Ajara was governed under the authoritarian rule of Aslan Abashidze until May 2004. See i.a. In-
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ever, treated here and briefly described in this section are Georgia’s secession conflicts 
with the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia in the northwest and South Ossetia in the 
north because they are underlying the dissonance between Georgia and Russia or, vice 
versa, exploited by Tbilisi and Moscow for their purposes in the conflict. They are also 
part of the challenge that external actors have to face in Georgia. This country in the 
South Caucasus suffers from additional deficits of ‘stateness’, displaying deep institutional 
weakness, worrying levels of corruption and organized crime, and several so-called no-go 
areas that have the potential to serve as retreats for international terrorists and violent 
non-state actors. 
Both Ossetians and Abkhazians are ethnically distinct from Georgians. While Georgia 
claims territorial integrity, the former aspire to national self-determination – South Os-
setia in the shape of a federation with North Ossetia within Russia, Abkhazia in the shape 
of associated relations with Russia rather than full integration. Against the framework of 
Saakashvili’s vow to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity and Tbilisi’s successful arma-
ment efforts (remarkably reforming its security structures with US support and raising the 
military expenditures from once 0.5 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) to 3 
per cent in 200627), the breakaway regions fear Tbilisi is preparing for military action in 
conflict resolution. Therefore, Tshkinvali and Sukhumi have increased their political-
military cooperation, invested in armament efforts themselves, and proceeded with politi-
cal and economic integration with the Russian Federation. This again puts time pressure 
on the Saakashvili administration because its top priority of reintegrating South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia moves further and further away. 
2.1 Georgia’s Conflict with South Ossetia 
South Ossetia28, bordering the Russian province of North Ossetia, represents the smallest 
among the secessionist entities in the post-Soviet space. It was granted the status of an 
autonomous region (oblast) in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923.29 In the late 
1980s, against the backdrop of the Glasnost policy of the last Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev (1985-1991), Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalists began striving for more 
 
 
 
ternational Crisis Group, Saakashvili’s Ajara Success: Repeatable elsewhere in Georgia? Europe Briefing, 
Tbilisi/Brussels, 18 August 2004. 
27 Cf. Uwe Halbach, Säbelrasseln und Friedenspolitik in Europas neuer Nachbarschaft, SWP-Aktuell 32, 
Berlin, Juli 2006, p. 1. 
28 The region’s name South Ossetia is the term most frequently used in official documents and the diplomatic 
discourse, as in this PRIF report. By Georgians, however, the region is often referred to as “Shida Kartli”, as 
“Tskhinvali Region”, or – by hard-line nationalists – as “Samachablo” (the land of the aristocratic Georgian 
Machabeli family); cf. International Crisis Group 2004, see above (footnote 14), p. 2. 
29 Autonomous regions (oblast) possessed the smallest degree of autonomy, mostly cultural, in the Soviet 
system – especially compared to autonomous republics; cf. Dehdashti 2000, see above (footnote 24), pp. 26-
36. In contrast, North Ossetia was given the status of autonomous republic in the Russian SSR, as was 
Abkhazia in the Georgian SSR. 
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autonomy. Understandings of history – in particular, of the duration of Ossetian presence 
in the region – differ, causing deep divisions. While Ossetians claim to populate their his-
torical homeland on both sides of the Caucasus where they migrated to from Persia at 
least five millennia ago, Georgians consider Ossetians as “guests” who arrived with mass 
movements to Georgia in the 17th to 19th centuries and whose presence, thereby, is not as 
ancient as their own. In the early 1990s, tensions were increased by a language issue30 as 
well as by the Georgian-nationalist orientation of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s rule. Gamsak-
hurdia31, the later first president of independent Georgia, came to power in the 1990 par-
liamentary elections that were boycotted by Ossetians because the Georgian Supreme 
Soviet had adopted an election law barring regional parties earlier. After South Ossetia 
had held its own elections in December, Gamsakhurdia abolished its autonomous oblast 
status. Even before Georgia’s declaration of independence on 9 April 1991, heavy fighting 
broke out in South Ossetia, resulting in Tbilisi’s de facto loss of control over this area by 
the end of 1990. On 20 September 1990, South Ossetia had already declared its independ-
ence, but strived for a federation with North Ossetia as part of Russia after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union.32
With sporadic Russian involvement, the fighting escalated once more in the spring of 
1992 and continued until June 1992 when a ceasefire agreement was reached. The ‘Sochi 
Agreement’ led to the deployment of the trilateral Joint Peace Keeping Forces (JPKF), 
consisting of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian troops, as well as to the establishment of the 
quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC), a negotiation mechanism with Georgian, 
South and North Ossetian and Russian participation. The 1990 to 1992 highly violent 
conflict resulted in approximately 1,000 casualties and displaced around 60,000 people.33 
This changed the intermixture of populations that existed before the war.34 As of Septem-
 
 
30 In 1989, the Georgian Supreme Soviet promoted its language program, establishing Georgian as the princi-
ple language countrywide. Ossetians reacted by passing a resolution on Ossetian as an official language in 
the autonomous region; cf. International Crisis Group 2004, see above (footnote 14), p. 3. The Ossetian 
language belongs to the Indo-European group and is related to Pushto and (more distantly) Farsi, but uses 
the Cyrillic alphabet; cf. Nikola Cvetkovski, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, Dissertation (Aalborg 
University), Danish Association for Research on the Caucasus, in: www.caucasus.dk/publication5.htm (ac-
cessed in 2/2006). 
31 Gamsakhurdia was a national dissident who had been arrested for anti-Soviet activities several times and 
who had excelled at human rights activities. He belonged to the founders of the Tbilisi wing of the Helsinki 
Group. In the 1970, the Helsinki Group called for the implementation of the principles of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
32 In a referendum held in January 1992, a large majority voted in favor of integration into the Russian Fed-
eration. The South Ossetian Supreme Council also pledged for this option on 19 November. Cf. Jawad 
2005, see above (footnote 9), p. 8 f. 
33 According to UNHCR estimations as of 1998, 30,000 Ossetians from Georgia and 10,000 from South Os-
setia registered as refugees in North Ossetia. Additionally, some 10,000 Georgians and persons of mixed 
ethnicity were displaced from South Ossetia to Georgia proper, and 5,000 internally displaced in South Os-
setia. 
34 According to the 1989 census, Ossetians in South Ossetia numbered 65,000 (66.6 per cent of an overall 
population of approximately 99,700, including some 26,000 ethnic Georgians), with 98,000 in the rest of 
Georgia. Today, South Ossetia has approximately 70 to 80,000 inhabitants. 
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ber 2004, the UNHCR facilitated the return of no more than 1,734 persons (513 families) 
from North to South Ossetia and to Georgia proper.35
Despite these burdens, not to speak of the atrocities committed by both sides36, until its 
re-ignition in July and August 2004 (see below, page 8), the South Ossetia conflict had 
been considered to be the most eased regional conflict. Not only had no military confron-
tations occurred since the 1992 ceasefire agreement, but contacts and trade had revived 
between Ossetians and Georgians living in and around the zone of conflict37, enabling a 
slow but progressive negotiation process. In 2000, it even seemed that South Ossetia’s 
former de facto President Lyudvig Chibirov and Georgia’s former President Eduard 
Shevardnadze might ultimately agree on re-integration.38 These hopes faded, when Eduard 
Kokoity succeeded Chibirov after the former’s victory in the December 2001 elections. 
Kokoity refused to discuss a political settlement regarding South Ossetia’s future status in 
Georgia. In 2004, he repeatedly called for South Ossetia’s integration into the Russian 
Federation and, on June 5, appealed to the Duma in this regard. Prior to this, Saakashvili, 
at his inauguration, had vowed to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity. In mid-2004, the 
achievements and the feelings of trust, that had been restored between 1992 and 2004 
were destroyed by a seriously miscalculated attempt to break a twelve-year deadlock in 
order to reintegrate South Ossetia swiftly. Tbilisi had initiated a large-scale anti-smuggling 
campaign in and around South Ossetia in December 2003, reinforcing it in May 2004.39 
Ossetians perceived this as preparation for military action. While Georgia had expected 
 
 
35 Cf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Movements as a Consequence of the 
Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, updated 1 September 2004. 
36 For a description of the atrocities committed by both sides in the 1990 to 1992 violent conflict, see Human 
Rights Watch, Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Violations of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in the Geor-
gia-South Ossetia Conflict, New York et al., March 1992, in: www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia.923/ 
georgia923full.pdf (accessed in 10/2006), pp. 17 ff. 
37 Protocol no. 3 of the Sochi Agreement defined a circle with a 15 km radius from the center of Tskhinvali as 
the zone of conflict as well as a security corridor consisting of a 14 km band divided evenly on both sides of 
the former oblast’s administrative borders. 
38 They met three times in 1996, 1997 and 1998, and both publicly expressed commitment to peaceful conflict 
settlement; cf. International Crisis Group 2004, see above (footnote 14), p. 8. 
39 The ‘frozen’ conflict in South Ossetia has provided a fertile ground for the development of illegal business 
such as smuggling, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and arms trading. Not only the South Ossetian elites and 
Russian troops profited from illegal trade, but also average citizens who gained livelihoods against the back-
ground of unemployment and poor economic development. Georgia lost significant customs revenue due 
to smuggling. 
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Kokoity’s regime to weaken quickly after smuggling was curbed40, the latter actually ap-
peared to grow even stronger as support from its population grew41. 
Regarding the 2004 crisis that almost escalated into a full-scale war, Georgia accused 
Russia of providing armored personnel carriers, tanks, other military equipment, fuel, and 
training by Russian army officers to South Ossetia. Russia, as in the recent 2006 crisis, 
thought that Georgia had deliberately escalated the situation in order to increase interna-
tional awareness and reveal the Russian peacekeepers’ alleged inability to carry out their 
mandate. Indeed, Tbilisi has made efforts towards an internationalization of conflict reso-
lution and peacekeeping, also with regard to Abkhazia. 
2.2 Georgia’s Conflict with Abkhazia 
As with South Ossetia, Abkhazia in Georgia’s northwest sought secession from Georgia in 
the early 1990s. Between 1917 and 1931, Abkhazia had represented a Soviet republic of its 
own, before it was integrated into the Georgian SSR as an autonomous republic. On 25 
August 1990, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet passed a ‘Declaration on the Sovereignty of 
Abkhazia’ which was annulled by the Georgian Supreme Soviet days later. After declaring 
independence in July 1992, the struggle for secession in Abkhazia heavily escalated, with 
forces loyal to Tbilisi occupying the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi. As armed groups from 
regions in Russia’s North Caucasus came to support Abkhazia, the latter began to regain 
territory. The war was one of the bloodiest post-Soviet conflicts, claiming up to 10,000 
lives and displacing around 250,000 people, most of them ethnic Georgians. Despite eco-
nomic and geopolitical rationales, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict evolved into an 
ethno-political conflict that divided the multinational society of pre-war Abkhazia.42 Like 
Ossetians, Abkhazians are ethnically distinct from Georgians; unlike Ossetians in South 
Ossetia, Abkhazians were clear minority within the territory of Abkhazia before the 1992 
to 1993 war, but by October 1993, almost all ethnic Georgians had fled Abkhazia43. The 
withdrawal of Georgian troops in September 1993 and the Moscow Ceasefire Agreement 
 
 
40 Saakashvili obviously thought he could repeat the Ajara success, sometimes called the “Second Rose Revo-
lution”, where a “skilful mix of threatened force and imaginative diplomacy” resulted – with the help of 
Russian mediation – in Ajara’s reintegration into Georgia. Ajara had been governed under the authoritarian 
rule of Aslan Abashidze who emigrated to Moscow in early May 2004. Cf. International Crisis Group, Sa-
akashvili’s Ajara Success: Repeatable Elsewhere in Georgia? Europe Briefing, Tbilisi/Brussels, 18 August 
2004. 
41 According to some NGO representatives interviewed by the International Crisis Group, before May 2004, 
only a minority of some 20 per cent in South Ossetia was firmly committed to independence and behind 
Kokoity. On 23 May 2004, ‘parliamentary elections’ were organized in South Ossetia, and ‘Unity’, the pro-
‘presidential’ party, won tow thirds of the seats. Cf. International Crisis Group 2004, see above (footnote 
14), p. 13. 
42 Cf. Oksana Antonenko 2005, see above (footnote 8), p. 206. 
43 According to the 1989 census, Abkhazia had a population of 525,000 people, of which 239,000 (45 per cent) 
were ethnic Georgians. Almost all the Georgians fled Abkhazia by October 1993. Cf. Gocha Khundadze, Geor-
gia’s refugee recount, Tbilisi, 28 April 2004, in: www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64D87Q? 
OpenDocument (accessed in 10/2006). 
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of 14 May 1994 ended the war. The ceasefire has since been monitored by around 1,500 
peacekeeping troops under the guise of the CIS and the UN Observer Mission to Georgia 
(UNOMIG). Negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhazian sides took place within 
the ‘Geneva Peace Process’, chaired by the UN, facilitated by Russia, and observed by the 
OSCE and the ‘Group of Friends’ (USA, Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Russia). 
Russia’s role during the 1992 to 1993 war has evolved into “the key obstacle to normal 
relations between Georgia and Russia”44. Moreover, Russia’s direct and indirect political 
and, more importantly, military assistance to both the Georgian (in the initial stages) and 
the Abkhazian sides (especially since September 1992) of the conflict, has undermined the 
trust of both sides toward Russia as an impartial and reliable mediator. This becomes 
evident in the fact that, despite its dependence on Russia as security guarantor and eco-
nomic partner, Abkhazia – unlike South Ossetia – only seeks associated relations with 
Russia rather than full integration. Especially in 1994, there were disagreements over the 
pace and scale of (Georgian) refugee return that provoked tensions between Moscow and 
Sukhumi. After Abkhazian forces entered the security zone in order to force Russian 
peacekeepers to retreat, the latter’s role was transformed from one of helping to promote 
gradual reintegration between the communities into one of keeping them apart, thereby 
adding to the ‘frozen’ nature of the conflict.45
This change of strategy on the Russian part was and still is reason for Georgia to seek 
ways to internationalize the peacekeeping effort, especially after Russia had refused to 
allow her peacekeepers to intervene when fighting broke out in the Gali region in May 
1998. The escalation was provoked by Georgian paramilitaries crossing the ceasefire line. 
As a result, hundreds of people were killed and over 20,000 Georgians who had returned 
to their homes were once again displaced. However, given Russia’s opposition, neither the 
UN nor the OSCE dispatched an alternative peacekeeping force.46 The crisis in bilateral 
relations between Tbilisi and Moscow, already existing in the late 1990s, worsened when 
Georgia failed to support the Russian effort in the second Chechen war that started in 
1999, unlike the first war (1994 to 1996). Back then, Georgia had probably supported 
Russia’s campaign against Chechen separatism because of the Chechens’ active participa-
tion in the Georgian-Abkhazian war in the early 1990s. In the second Chechen war, Russia 
even accused Georgia of sheltering Chechen rebels who had allegedly moved across the 
border into Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. Russia launched several military operations there, 
violating Georgia’s sovereignty. Russia’s activities were justified by the fight against terror-
ism, as was intensified US-Georgian security co-operation in the shape of the Georgian 
Train and Equip Program (GTEP), deploying around 200 US military advisors and train-
ers between fall 2001 and April 2004. GTEP was succeeded by the Sustainment and Stabil-
 
 
44 Antonenko 2005, see above (footnote 8), p. 209. 
45 Cf. Dov Lynch, Managing Separatist States: A Eurasian Case Study, ISS-EU Occasional Papers no. 86, Paris, 
November 2001, p. 17. 
46 Cf. Antonenko 2005, see above (footnote 8), pp. 224 f. 
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ity Operations Program (SSOP).47 Russia perceived these US activities as an interference 
with its traditional sphere, raising geopolitical concerns. 
The deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations resulted in a reorientation of Mos-
cow’s policies towards Abkhazia. Although Russia officially continued to support Geor-
gia’s territorial integrity, it expanded relations with Sukhumi, endorsing the ‘presidential’ 
elections and a referendum on independence in Abkhazia in 1999. This referendum, how-
ever, has to be put into question because almost all ethnic Georgians had fled Abkhazia by 
October 1993, changing the prewar intermixture of populations when Abkhazians had 
been a clear minority within the territory of Abkhazia. Furthermore, Russia not only re-
opened its border with Abkhazia, ending an isolation policy implemented in December 
1994, but also introduced a visa regime for Georgian citizens, while making an exception 
for residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in December 2000.48 Moscow also provided 
assistance to Abkhazia against an incursion into the Abkhazian part of the Kodori Gorge 
staged by Georgian security forces in September 2001. Since the Georgian-Abkhazian 
political dialogue was suspended thereafter, the so-called Boden Initiative of July 2002 
unsuccessfully tried to give new impetus to the negotiation process. Dieter Boden, Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, released a discussion paper proposing a fed-
eral model that would give Abkhazia the broadest autonomy and even recognition as a 
‘sovereign entity’ within Georgia.49 But Sukhumi refused to negotiate on anything not 
containing a path to independence. Not until the Russian-sponsored Sochi meeting be-
tween the Russian and Georgian presidents on 6 and 7 March 2003, was the political dia-
logue between Georgia and Abkhazia (at least partially) restored. The meeting placed 
Moscow in the role of key mediator after the UN-led political process had been put on 
hold. This role was not impartial, however, but made Russia a party to the negotiations 
representing her own interests as well as those of the Abkhazian side. President Shevard-
nadze received much criticism within Georgia for signing the Sochi agreements. After the 
‘Rose Revolution’, the Saakashvili administration distanced itself from this bilateral for-
mat and Russia began to unilaterally implement many of the economic projects that 
should have been linked to the return of displaced persons. Russia’s main contribution to 
the Abkhazian economy was related to cross-border trade (primarily citrus fruits and 
other agricultural products) and especially to tourism, although most hotels are owned by 
Russians.50
Despite the fact that Russia will remain Abkhazia’s principal source of economic and 
political support, Abkhazians have developed a strong sense of community and a will to 
be as independent from external influences as possible. This was especially expressed in 
 
 
47 Cf. Jawad 2005, see above (footnote 9), pp. 8, 13, and 29. 
48 Cf. Antonenko 2005, see above (footnote 8), pp. 230. 
49 For an analysis of the ‘Boden Paper’ see Bruno Coppieters, The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, in: Bruno Cop-
pieters et al. (eds.), Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery, 
Ghent (Academia Press), 2004, pp. 203-208, here: chapter 5.3.2; also published electronically in:  
http://ecmi.de/jemie/download/1-2004Chapter5.pdf (accessed in 10/2006). 
50 Cf. Antonenko 2005, see above (footnote 8), pp. 241 ff. 
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Abkhazia’s ‘presidential’ elections of October 2004, when candidate Sergei Bagapsh won 
against Russian-backed candidate Raul Khajimba, notwithstanding manipulations from 
Moscow. At first, Khajimba and Moscow did not accept the election results, but in De-
cember a compromise was reached stipulating that in the re-elections Bagapsh would run 
for president and Khajimba for vice president.51
2.3 Intermediate Conclusion 
Over a decade after the wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia of the early 1990s, Russia has 
evolved as a key player in the negotiation processes. This role, however, is less one of an 
impartial mediator, but rather of a party following its own interests. Furthermore this role 
has contributed to the ‘frozen’ nature of the conflicts – a persistent nature that has al-
lowed Russia to keep its presence and influence in the region and obstructed Georgia 
from building a strong and fully sovereign state. As a reaction, Tbilisi has called for an 
internationalization of conflict resolution – a call that might have entrapped Georgia to 
deliberately worsen matters in order to increase international awareness. Other than in 
the 2004 South Ossetia crisis, when Washington and Brussels did not openly criticize 
Moscow for its involvement, but rather warned Saakashvili not to enflame passions in the 
Caucasus, in the recent crisis, the world is astonished by Russia’s seemingly bizarrely ex-
aggerated reaction. But despite the fact that Russia has indeed played the suppressing role 
that Saakashvili hoped the international community would see, the Georgian President 
has miscalculated and overdrawn the bow. The USA has made a deal with Russia with 
regard to the October 13 resolution against Tbilisi, NATO still only offers ‘intensified 
dialogue’ instead of a membership action plan, and Georgia, therefore, shifts her focus to 
Europe. 
These developments, summed up by the fact that the UN- and OSCE-led negotiation 
processes have so far failed to produce conflict settlements, raise the question that an in-
creased contribution to conflict resolution by the EU might facilitate an ‘unfreezing’ of 
the conflicts due to its image as ‘honest broker’. As previously mentioned, the EU itself 
has emphasized the primary importance of conflict settlement and proclaimed its inten-
tion to become more engaged in conflict resolution. The question, if the EU follows its 
own assessment and proclamation, will be traced by analyzing the EU’s interests and ac-
tivities to date in the following section, before conclusions will be drawn on what role the 
EU should play in Georgia. 
 
 
51 Cf. Jawad 2005, see above (footnote 9), p. 11 and Antonenko 2005, see above (footnote 8), p. 258 ff. 
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3. EU Interests and Activities in Georgia52
The last section that has briefly described Georgia’s two secession conflicts in South Os-
setia and Abkhazia and their persistent ‘frozen’ nature, has raised the issue that the EU – 
with its image as ‘honest broker’ – might be better suited to giving new impetus to the 
stagnating processes of conflict resolution than Russia, the UN or the OSCE. Should the 
EU get directly involved in the negotiation processes? Should it promote dialogue between 
Tbilisi and Moscow, or take one of the two sides? Should it contribute to conflict resolu-
tion only indirectly by promoting good governance so that Georgia proper appears more 
attractive to South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Should it stick with its soft approach to conflict 
resolution and financially support the UN and OSCE efforts? In order to trace the ques-
tion of a stronger EU role in conflict resolution, that would not only correspond to the 
EU’s own assessment that conflict settlement is key to the effectiveness of any external 
assistance be, but also to its proclamation to become more engaged in conflict resolution 
itself, firstly, the EU’s and its Member States’ interests in the region of the South Caucasus 
will be analyzed because they are relevant for the development of EU activities and sec-
ondly, the EU’s actual activities since the early 1990s will be described. 
3.1 The EU’s Interests in Georgia and the South Caucasus Region 
Notwithstanding the recent crisis between Georgia and Russia that has been noted by the 
European media, all in all, the European public has so far not paid a lot of attention to the 
developments in the South Caucasus region. These regional developments, however, are 
of relevance beyond its geographical area. The South Caucasus, an intersection between 
Asia and Europe, between orient and occident, has been dominated by different powers 
throughout history and, today, is once again an arena for conflicting interests. At present, 
these especially concern its role as a transport corridor for energy resources from the Cas-
pian Basin. Furthermore, with ‘frozen’ conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as well as 
in Nagorno-Karabakh), the ethnically and religiously diverse South Caucasus region is not 
only a crises region in itself, it is also located in geographical closeness to the unstable 
North Caucasus as well as the ‘broader Middle East’53. 
But still, in contrast to internal issues such as finding a new ‘European identity’54 after 
the last round of enlargement and the major setback of the project for a European consti-
tution, as well as external issues, like the various crises in the broader Middle East, Rus-
 
 
52 This section is based on an article to be published in Annette Jünemann and Michèle Knodt (eds.), The EU 
as an External Democracy Promoter. Die externe Demokratieförderung der EU. Schriftenreihe des Arbeits-
kreises Europäische Integration e.V., Baden-Baden (Nomos), 2006 (forthcoming). 
53 The term “broader Middle East” traces back to the so-called Broader Middle East and North Africa Initia-
tive, that - after being suggested by the USA - was started at the G-8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia (USA) in 
June 2004. 
54 With regard to a “European cultural and geopolitical identity” cf. Adrian Severin, The Future of the EU: A 
Need for a New Vision, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 2006 (1), p. 11-19.
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sia’s Caucasian periphery might not seem to be one of the EU’s major concerns. The re-
gion does not border directly onto the EU (yet) and none of the region’s countries are 
candidates for EU membership (yet). Nevertheless, Georgia is of fundamental relevance 
for the EU – not only for reasons of energy security that becomes increasingly important 
in EU security thinking, but also because Georgia embodies all the (positive and negative) 
challenges that the EU faces as a security actor at the beginning 21st century.55 Georgia 
displays a unique combination of security risks and threats: It suffers from state fragility 
with two unresolved conflicts on its territory, weak state institutions, widespread corrup-
tion and organized crime as well as several so-called no-go areas.56 Furthermore, it will be 
in direct proximity of the EU once Romania and Bulgaria accede to the Union in January 
2007. The interpretation provided for by the European Security Strategy in this regard is 
clear-cut: “Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised 
crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all 
pose problems for the EU.”57 Therefore, the EU faces the difficult task of dealing with a 
contested state on Europe’s borders. The challenge in this context is to develop genuine 
foreign policy beyond the policy of enlargement. With the ENP, the EU has started to 
make an effort in this direction (see below, page 26). The EU’s interests in the South Cau-
casus, which have led to the development towards the ENP, can be described as threefold: 
economic, security-related, and normative. 
The EU played a rather marginal role as a political player during the 1990s. Although 
the EU provided technical assistance and aid to a noteworthy degree, the region had al-
ways been distant enough, geographically speaking, so that threats emerging from there 
were not perceived as immediate.58 Therefore, European activities focused on economic 
transition – political dialogue remained more rhetoric than reality. Furthermore, in order 
not to remain dependent on Russian gas, the EU has strived for a diversification of its 
energy supplies for about 15 years now. It has identified the Caspian Sea as a potential 
alternative source with the South Caucasus region as an important transport corridor.59 In 
2000, the EC emphasized these energy-related interests when it declared access to the Cas-
pian Basin energy reserves of strategic interest to the EU.60 Therefore, the project of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline is of major concern, not only for the EU. 
This view of the South Caucasus as part of the resource-rich Caspian region, domi-
nated the 1990s, although, already at the end of the 1980s, it had notably made an appear-
 
 
55 Cf. Dov Lynch, Why Georgia matters, in: Chaillot Paper, no. 86, Paris, February 2006, p. 8. 
56 For an analysis of such challenges in Georgia cf. i.a. Jawad 2005, see above (footnote 9). 
57 Council of the European Union 2003, see above (footnote 3), p. 7. 
58 Cf. Dov Lynch, The EU: towards a strategy, in: Chaillot Paper, no. 65, Paris, December 2003, pp. 171-196, 
here: 178. 
59 Cf. John Gault, EU energy security and the periphery, in: Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union 
Foreign and Security Policy – Towards a neighbourhood strategy, London/New York 2004, pp. 170-185. 
60 Cf. European Commission, TACIS Regional Cooperation Indicative Programme, 2000-2003, p. 4. 
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ance as a crises zone showing a high density of symptoms for weak ‘stateness’.61 By the end 
of the 1990s, the problems of unresolved regional conflicts and unfinished processes of 
state-building became more prominent once again. And after 11 September 2001, the 
focus of the international community, including the EU, moved to such security-relevant 
issues. 
With the latest EU enlargement of May 2004, the South Caucasus moved closer to the 
EU’s borders, also increasing the EU’s normative interest of promoting its liberal values in 
international relations. This is based on the assumption that “an international system of 
states embracing these values will be one in which it is easier to pursue the Union’s exter-
nal objectives”62. 
Within this group of interests, a series of debates have taken place within different EU 
bodies on how to best approach the region, especially since the coming into force of the so 
called Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in 1999 (see below, page 21). The 
EC has participated through various communications and several Commission staff work-
ing documents arguing for the primary importance of conflict settlement so that external 
assistance is effective in the South Caucasus region. It also emphasized the need for the 
Union to lay down broad strategic objectives for the whole region. The European Parlia-
ment (EP), too, has called for the development of a South Caucasus strategy since 1999 
and, since 2001, has picked up many of the EC’s ideas. In general, the EP has been sug-
gesting a much stronger policy towards the South Caucasus region. The Council has called 
for an emphasis on greater regional cooperation. The Council Presidencies of Sweden 
(2001)63, Greece and Italy (2003)64 have given priority to the South Caucasus region. The 
present Presidencies of Austria and Finland (2006) have stated in their operational pro-
gram that “[t]he Union will work with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to begin imple-
mentation of the ENP Action Plans. The Council may consider a troika mission to the 
Southern Caucasus to add momentum to this process. It may also look at enhancing the 
role of the EU Special Representative in the Southern Caucasus, aiming eventually at his 
permanent presence in the region. Efforts should continue to ensure the support of the 
 
 
61 Cf. Uwe Halbach, Der Kaukasus in neuem Licht - Die EU und Russland in ihrer schwierigsten Nachbar-
schaftsregion, Berlin (SWP), 2005, pp. 19 f. 
62 S. Neil MacFarlane, The Caucasus and Central Asia - Towards a non-strategy, in: Dannreuther (ed.) 2004, 
see above (footnote 59), pp. 119-134, here: 127. 
63 “Increased attention should be focused on Moldova and the Southern Caucasus.” Council of the European 
Union, Programme of the Swedish Presidency of the European Union - 1 January to 30 June 2001, Brussels 
2001, in: www.eu2001.se/static/pdf/program/ordfprogram_eng.pdf (accessed in 5/2006), p. 24. 
64 “The Council will examine ways and means to further promote relations in all fields between the EU and the 
countries of the Southern Caucasus. Coordination with other major players and an enhanced visibility of EU 
initiatives constitute the main lines of action.” Council of the European Union, Operational Programme of the 
Council for 2006 submitted by the incoming Austrian and Finnish Presidencies, Brussels, 22 December 2005, 
in: www.eu2006.at/includes/Download_Dokumente/Agendas/0512draft_operationalprogrammeEN.pdf (ac-
cessed in 5/2006), p. 44. 
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EU in helping to solve regional conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and to enhance border 
controls in Georgia.”65
As far as individual Member States are concerned, all in all, the South Caucasus coun-
tries have lacked a lobbyist among them during the 1990s in order to catalyze a greater 
interest from Brussels, other than e.g. the Baltic States in the shape of the Scandinavian 
countries, or Spain and Italy in favor of the Mediterranean states.66
A number of Member States saw the value-added of an enhanced EU role in the region 
as limited, arguing that the processes of conflict resolution stagnated and the South Cau-
casus was already crowded with external actors. Particularly France and the UK have 
taken a critical position towards an enhanced role of the EU in the region, despite or 
rather because of the fact that they both have taken an active role in their national poli-
cies. Notwithstanding, the UK lobbied for Georgia to be included in the ENP and even 
keenly advocated EU accession after the ‘Rose Revolution’.67 Taking obvious interest in a 
leading position concerning energy development in the shape of the construction of the 
BTC and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines, especially with the British Petroleum 
(BP) company, she has appointed her former ambassador in Moscow, Brian Fall, as UK 
Special Representative for Georgia in October 2002, later on for the whole South Caucasus 
region. The UK is also among the Member States who were most involved in Georgia after 
the ‘Rose Revolution’. It supported the new government through the “Reuniting Europe” 
budget line of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s “Global Opportunities Fund” 
(GOF).68
Nevertheless, some Member States have called for a stronger role of the EU – especially 
Germany and several Nordic states. Germany, who will hold the Council Presidency in the 
first half of 200769, has launched a “Caucasus Initiative” in her development cooperation 
in April 2001, aimed at a better understanding between the three countries by promoting 
measures with a cross-border impact in five sectors: reforming the judiciary and develop-
ing civil society (municipal democracy), facilitating access to credit in the private sector, 
securing supplies in the energy sector, combating tuberculosis in the health sector, and 
preserving biodiversity.70 She has supported the inclusion of the South Caucasus countries 
 
 
65 Council of the European Union 2005, see above (footnote 64), p. 53. The appointment of an EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) for the Southern Caucasus is described below (see page 23). 
66 Cf. Halbach 2005, see above (footnote 61), p. 22. 
67 Cf. Richard Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, Madrid 2006, in: 
www.fride.org/eng/Publications/publication.aspx?item=1049 (accessed in 5/2006), pp. 19 and 227. 
68 Cf. Youngs 2006, see above (footnote 67), p. 227. 
69 In this regard, an outlook on the actual working program emphasizes the relevance of energy policy for the 
shaping of foreign and security policy and the stabilization of the immediate geographical neighborhood as 
well as the promotion of freedom, democracy and free-market economies in other parts of the world; cf. 
Speech by State Secretary Silberberg “A Preview of Germany’s EU Presidency: The Status of the Federal 
Government’s Preparations” on 4 October 2006, in: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/ 
Reden/2006/061004-SilberbergEuropa.html (accessed in 10/2006). 
70 Cf. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, The BMZ Caucasus Initiative - 
Encouraging Understanding, Materials, Bonn, March 2005, in: www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/fach/ 
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into the ENP71, but along with France has been least supportive in relation to EU acces-
sion72. Until the end of 2004, Germany has allocated 612 million euro for financial and 
technical assistance as well as for development-oriented emergency aid to the three coun-
tries.73 Germany was not only the first country to recognize Georgia after independence in 
1991, but also considers Georgia as the only country in the region of the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia to be a “priority partner country” receiving the full range of the BMZ’s 
(Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) development policy in-
struments in selected priority areas.74 Germany, whose close relations to Georgia can 
partly be explained by Shevardnadze’s role in the German reunification, also provides the 
largest national contingent to UNOMIG in Abkhazia and is also the coordinator of the 
UN Secretary General’s “Group of Friends”, which attempts to settle Tbilisi’s dispute with 
the secessionist republic. 
New impetus was given by Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ in November 2003 as well as by 
the latest EU enlargement in May 2004. This not only brought the region closer to 
Europe’s borders, but also provided the South Caucasus countries with new sympathetic 
advocates. The latter not only concerns Poland, who, even before her own accession to the 
EU, has emphasized the “utmost importance” of the development and democratization of 
the South Caucasus states and initiated an “Eastern Dimension” strategy that seeks to 
complement the EU’s ENP75, but also the Baltic States, which Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia share a common background as former members of the Soviet Union with. The 
Baltic countries believe they have a duty to act as mentors to other states aspiring to join 
either NATO or the EU.76 A statement made by Lithuania’s Prime Minister Algirdas 
 
 
 
materialien/138Kaukasusengl.pdf (accessed in 5/2005), p. 13; see also www.bmz.de/de/laender/regionen/ 
europa_udssr/index.html#g (accessed in 5/2006). 
71 Concerning the ENP see page 26. 
72 Youngs 2006, see above (footnote 67), p. 19. 
73 Germany allocated 132 million Euro to Armenia, 155 million Euro to Azerbaijan, 259 million Euro to Georgia, 
and 66 million Euro to the region; cf. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwick-
lung (BMZ), Deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Zentralasien und Südkaukasus (Bilaterale Gesam-
tleistungen bis 31. Dezember 2004), Bonn, April 2005, in: www.bmz.de/de/laender/regionen/europa_udssr/ 
EZ_ZentralasienKaukasus.pdf (accessed in 5/2006), pp. 1 f. 
74 Germany invested 26 million Euro as financial cooperation and five million Euro as technical cooperation 
in Georgia in 2002 and 2003; see www.bmz.de/de/laender/partnerlaender/georgien/zusammenarbeit.html 
(accessed in 10/2005). 
75 In a speech in September 2002, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: “The global cooperation of the 
European Union and the United States for the development of trade, investment and security, including the 
safety of energy supplies, should be extended to cover Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian states. The devel-
opment and democratization of those regions is of utmost importance for a secure world and protection of 
common economic interests.” Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz, Transatlantic relations today and in the future - A 
speech by Mr. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland at George-
town University, September 10, 2002, in: www.msz.gov.pl/10,wrzes-nia,2002r.,,Wystapienie,Ministra,Spraw, 
Zagranicznych,w,Georgetown,,Waszyngton,1271.html (accessed in 5/2006), p. 6. 
76 Cf. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Dual Enlargement and the Baltic States: 
Security Policy Implications, A Report of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 
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Brazauskas at his visit to Germany on 10 May 2006, where he met Federal Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, emphasizes this: “The Baltic States, which are EU members already, have 
much experience to share with the countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Southern Cauca-
sus countries”77. Therefore, the South Caucasus countries could benefit from the Baltic 
experience of transition and EU alignment. Latvia has issued a country strategy paper on 
her development cooperation with Georgia for 2006 to 2008. And Estonia and Lithuania 
have played an important role in the deployment of “EUJUST THEMIS” to Georgia, the 
EU’s first rule of law mission within the common European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) (see below, page 26). 
With reference to the ‘Rose Revolution’, Sweden – whose development cooperation 
with the region began in 1998 – issued a new strategy for development cooperation with 
the South Caucasus states in January 2006, emphasizing “[i]t is vital that the EU display 
both a clear interest in the states of Southern Caucasus and an unequivocal commitment 
towards them. In time, closer ties with the EU can lead to greater stability and less poverty 
in the region [...]”78. The strategy includes a regional component to promote conflict reso-
lution and cross-border contacts. In general, priority is given to promoting respect for 
human rights. With regard to Georgia, Sweden was one of the main advocates of her in-
corporation into the ENP79 and has undertaken to double her development assistance, 
while emphasizing that development cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose 
“will to implement political reform appears to be limited [...], should again be limited in 
financial scope”80. 
This brief analysis of the EU’s interests in the South Caucasus has shown that attention 
paid to the three countries is unequally distributed among the 25 Member States and that 
the focus of the different EU institutions has moved closer to the region in recent years. 
What activities the EU has actually undertaken in Georgia against this background since 
independence will be analyzed in the next section. 
3.2 EU Activities in Georgia 
Although the South Caucasus has always been of relevance to international actors, the EU 
has proceeded rather reluctantly in Russia’s Caucasian periphery. It has taken its time to 
differentiate the ‘post-Soviet space’ in its policies; and the South Caucasus were the last to 
 
 
 
Conference in Tallinn, Estonia, February 11-13, 2004, in: www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/ 
page-pubs-conf-1/static/xdocs/conf/2004-conferences/0409/0409-report.pdf (accessed in 5/2006), p. 4. 
77 Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Press Release, 10 May 2006, in: www.lrv.lt/main_en.php?id= 
en_aktualijos_su_video/p.php&n=132 (accessed in 5/2006). 
78 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Strategy for development cooperation with Southern Caucasus - 
January 2006 - December 2009, Stockholm 2006, in: www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/97/72/ 
66b7b766.pdf (accessed in 5/2006), p. 1. 
79 Cf. Youngs 2006, see above (footnote 67), p. 200. 
80 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2006, see above (footnote 78), p. 2. 
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be considered as a region in itself. In this environment it has to be kept in mind that the 
wider a definition of a region, the more difficult it is to develop a political strategy for it. 
And apart from a region of the ‘post-Soviet space’, even the South Caucasus region com-
prises three quite different countries, with Georgia being one of them. With regard to this 
regional approach or ‘non-approach’, it might not be surprising that the EU has not been 
perceived as a political player of the international arena in the region during the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the EU and its Member States, with various projects of technical assistance, 
has been a major donor in the post-Soviet space after the end of the Cold War.81
Table 1 summarizes the EU assistance that was allocated to the three South Caucasus 
states between 1992 and 2003. While this reflects that the EU has indeed been an impor-
tant donor in the region, it remains outplayed by the scale of US support – even if assis-
tance provided by the individual EU Member States is included in the comparison. Be-
tween 1992 and 2001 Georgia alone – as the second largest recipient of US foreign aid 
after Israel – has received 986 million USD through the US Freedom Support Act.82 Geor-
gia will also benefit from another 295 million USD through the US Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) over the next five years.83
Table 1: EU Assistance by Country, 1992 to 2003 
EU assistance [million euro] Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
TACIS national allocations 98.90 116.50 111.00 
Nuclear Safety 29.00   
Exceptional Macro-Financial Assistance  30.00 31.50 
Humanitarian Aid: ECHO 68.79 92.09 98.25 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 50.20 65.70 62.55 
Food Security Program 102.30 77.00 71.25 
Rehabilitation  18.37 19.50 
Exceptional Humanitarian Aid 1.50 9.50 10.00 
EIDHR   7.55 
Other assistance   8.25 
Total 350.69 409,16 419,85 
Source: European Commission, Annex to: “European Neighbourhood Policy”, Country Reports Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, SEC(2005) 285/3, SEC(2005) 286/3, SEC(2005) 288/3. 
 
 
81 Cf. i.a. Sabine Fischer, Integrationsprozesse im post-sowjetischen Raum: Voraussetzungen, Erwartungen 
und Potenziale, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, vol. 2006, no. 1, 2006, pp. 134-149, here: 143. 
82 Cf. Lynch 2003, see above (footnote 58), p. 178. See also the overview available at USAID Georgia, 
www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/ge/index.html (accessed in 3/2006). 
83 Cf. www.mcg.ge/english/Public_affairs/News/News_37.htm (accessed in 10/2006); for a brief description 
also see Jawad 2005, see above (footnote 9), p. 31. 
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The Early 1990s: Humanitarian and Technical Assistance 
In the early years of Georgia’s independence, the EU’s main instrument was humanitarian 
assistance provided for by the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO). 
ECHO had a major focus on the South Caucasus and only began to draw down its emer-
gency programs in 1996.84 Furthermore, the EU launched the grant-financed “Technical 
Assistance Program to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries” (TACIS) 
in 1991 that aims at enhancing the transition processes towards market economy and 
democracy in the countries of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. In 
January 2000, the Council adopted a new regulation concerning the provision of assis-
tance to the TACIS partner states. While in the earlier phase between 1991 and 1999 assis-
tance approximated 4.2 billion euro, this new phase of cooperation is aimed at providing 
3.1 billion euro until the end of 2006 and at focusing on certain key areas of activity, 
namely support for institutional, legal and administrative reform; support for the private 
sector and assistance for economic development; support for addressing the social conse-
quences of transition; development of infrastructure networks; nuclear safety; promotion 
of environmental protection and management of natural resources; development of the 
rural economy.85 The program is defined and managed by the EC’s External Relations 
Directorate-General (DG Relex), which is responsible for political direction and multi-
annual programming, as well as the EuropeAid Cooperation Office that is responsible for 
managing the project cycle and annual programs. 
Several programs that were intended to foster regional development and cooperation 
or to deal with cross-border problems as well as ad hoc allocations summed up the major 
instruments of TACIS and the PCAs (see page 21). Thus, Georgia has featured as part of 
the EU’s wider regional policy frameworks. Projects like “Transport Corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia” (TRACECA), which was established in 1993, promotes new transport 
corridors and larger areas of Eurasian markets and commerce, or the “Interstate Oil and 
Gas Transport to Europe” (INOGATE) program supports cooperation in oil and gas in-
frastructure systems. 
In 1994, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was es-
tablished upon an initiative of the European Parliament. In order to provide a legal basis 
for all human rights and democratization activities of the EU, the Council adopted two 
regulations on the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in 1999. The regulations provided for 
the establishment of a Human Rights and Democracy Committee that started its work in 
July 1999. The EIDHR’s main aim is to fund activities that pursue the goals of promoting 
human rights, democratization and conflict prevention in third countries, carried out 
primarily in partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international 
 
 
84 Cf. MacFarlane 2004, see above (footnote 62), p. 134. 
85 Cf. Council of the European Union, Council Regulation No. 99/2000 of December 1999 concerning the provi-
sion of assistance to the partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 18 January 2000, in:  
ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/projects/tacis/publications/general/new_regulation_en.pdf (accessed in 5/2006),  
p. 7. 
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organizations. In contrast to other EU programs, it can be used without the consent of 
host governments because it is implemented with different partners excluding official 
state, national and international governmental organizations or institutions. This repre-
sents a significant added value if, for instance, the main EU programs are not available for 
some reason, e.g. because of suspension. In 2002, Georgia was one of twenty-nine focus 
countries of the EIDHR, with further projects in 2003 and 2004, receiving some two mil-
lion euro for support to civil society. 
Since 1999: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
With the coming into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in 
1999, regulating bilateral relations with partner countries, TACIS became a somewhat 
more strategic instrument because it was no longer a “stand-alone activity”, but part of an 
evolving relationship with each partner country. Within the legal framework of the PCAs, 
which formalize bilateral relations between the EU and the individual partner country for 
ten years, the programming and identification of TACIS funding consists of Country 
Strategy Papers (CSPs), which are established for five to seven years, defining the long-
term objectives for cooperation and identifying the strategic priorities, and of (National) 
Indicative Programs, usually established for three years, which describe sectoral and cross-
cutting issues, specific objectives and expected results. The Country Strategy Paper Geor-
gia for the period of 2002 to 2006 was revised by the EC outside the regular cycle of pro-
gramming reviews in September 2003 due to the serious deterioration of the security 
situation and the lack of progress towards democracy and market economy.86 The EC 
argued that “more than ten years of significant levels of EU assistance have not yet led to 
the expected results […] [T]he Georgian government has not yet shown the level of 
commitment to realize the policy objectives linked to assistance which the EU may legiti-
mately expect.”87 Henceforth, assistance would be provided only “if and insofar”88 as the 
Georgian government undertook credible reform measures. This cut in assistance did not 
last long because of the change of government in November 2003. 
Three joint EU-partner country institutions have been created through title XI “Insti-
tutional, general and final provisions” of the PCA: 
(1) a “Cooperation Council”, which consists of members of the Council of the EU and 
members of the EC, on the one hand, and of members of the Government of the part-
ner country, on the other hand, and that meets once a year on ministerial level in or-
der to supervise the implementation of the agreement, 
 
 
86 EU-Georgia relations were adversely affected by a number of security incidents, e.g. in December 2001, a 
member of the EC Delegation in Georgia, Günther Beuchel, was murdered, and in June 2002, a TACIS con-
tractor, Peter Shaw, was kidnapped and held for five months. Both crimes were never brought to justice by 
the Georgian authorities. 
87 European Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2003 - 2006, Tacis National Indicative Programme 2004 - 
2006, Georgia, adopted by the Commission on 23 September 2003, in: ec.europa.eu/comm/external_ 
relations/georgia/csp/georgia_csp_6.pdf (accessed in 6/2005), p. 21. 
88 Ibid., p. 4. 
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(2) a “Cooperation Committee”, which is composed of representatives of the members of 
the Council and of members of the EC on the one hand, and of representatives of the 
Government of the partner country on the other, and that meets regularly (normally) 
on senior civil servant level in order to assist the Cooperation Council, and 
(3) a “Parliamentary Cooperation Committee”, which consists of members of the EP and 
of the partner country’s Parliament, and that meets at intervals it determines itself in 
order to exchange views. 
The PCA provides for a political framework of political dialogue, EU support of de-
mocratic and economic transition, the promotion of trade and investment, and the estab-
lishment of frameworks for legislative, economic, social, financial, scientific, technological 
and cultural cooperation.89 Anyhow, the titles of ‘political dialogue’, ‘legislative coopera-
tion’, and ‘cooperation on matters relating to democracy and human rights’ take up only 
one page of the PCA, while the titles of ‘trade in goods’, ‘provisions affecting business and 
investment’, and ‘economic cooperation’ take up about 27 pages of the agreement, which 
totals 51 pages. Therefore, “the heart of the PCA[s] is economic and technical”90. Albeit, 
not only has the PCA established an institutionalized political dialogue, it also has the 
same goal of trying to achieve the partner country’s commitment to common values and 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, respectively, and “use the same strategies and 
instruments”91 as in the framework of enlargement. They provide for political condition-
ality, but in their implementation fail to do so effectively. Instead of a suspension clause, 
they only contain an article providing for each party of the agreement to “take appropriate 
measures”92 in the case of violation. A revision of the CSP for Georgia was decided due to 
a deterioration of the situation. This was accompanied by “the unusual step”93 of increas-
ing amounts for institutional reform and civil society. New projects included a large-scale 
voter education project. In sharp contrast to the enlargement framework, the PCAs envi-
sion close trade relations and political cooperation but cannot offer EU membership as a 
strong incentive. The PCAs do not create symmetric relations and most of the so-called 
partner countries only have the threat of an instability export as leverage in order to aver 
their demands in negotiations with the EU.94 The political dimension had a low profile 
prior to the ‘Rose Revolution’. 
 
 
89 Cf. Article 1 of the PCA. 
90 Lynch 2003, see above (footnote 58), p. 181. 
91 Tanja A. Börzel/Thomas Risse, One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democ-
racy and the Rule of Law, Center for Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, 
2005, p. 15. 
92 This clause is found in Article 98 of the PCA with Georgia. 
93 Cf. Youngs 2006, see above (footnote 67), p. 74. 
94 Cf. William Wallace, Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25, in: Notre Europe 
Policy Papers No. 4, July 2003, p. 18. 
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Since 2003: The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus 
Frustration with the lack of progress of the PCAs’ implementation and the accession of all 
three South Caucasus countries to the Council of Europe by 2001 resulted in an increase 
in EU activity. The Swedish Presidency in 2001 gave priority to the region and, starting 
with the first visit of a EU troika, composed of Javier Solana, Chris Patten and Anna 
Lindt, to the South Caucasus in February 2001, Europe has shown increasing political 
interest in the region. The events of 11 September 2001 have fostered the perception of a 
connection between weak statehood and threats to international security. Since weak 
‘stateness’ is among the major problems of the South Caucasus, this region became in-
creasingly relevant to the EU for security reasons too. 
In July 2003, the EU appointed Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie as the Special Repre-
sentative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus.95 The EUSR is supposed to support the work of 
the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Solana in 
the region and to contribute to the EU’s policy objectives, including assisting Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia in carrying out political and economic reforms, preventing and 
assisting in the resolution of conflicts, promoting the return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, engaging constructively with key national actors neighboring the re-
gion, supporting intra-regional cooperation and ensuring coordination, consistency and 
effectiveness of the EU's action in the South Caucasus.96
While the earlier EU instruments have mainly been focused on technical measures to 
support economic transition and – even though there has in fact been substantial privati-
zation of economies accompanied by a return to growth and a monetary stabilization – 
political and other objectives provided for in the agreements have so far been less sophis-
ticated, the EUSR clearly represents a political instrument. In general, Brussels has de-
cided to not get directly involved in the negotiation processes of the ‘frozen’ conflicts in 
the South Caucasus region, but to leave these tasks to the UN mission and the OSCE.97 
This has been referred to as the ‘checkbook effect’: The EU is in funds and offers fast and 
consequential support, but only when the partner country is ‘ready’, that is the basis for 
peace has to have already been established.98 Nevertheless, EUSR Talvitie took a more 
active role in the South Ossetia crisis of the summer 2004 visiting the region quite regu-
larly. 
All in all, with the appointment of an EUSR the EU has gained visibility in the region 
of the South Caucasus that had been rather limited before, although the instrument re-
mains “to be of low profile and instrumental for smoothing potentially antagonistic rela-
 
 
95 Cf. Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP, OJ L 169 of 8.7.2003. 
96 Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 2003 concerning the appointment of an EU Special Repre-
sentative for the South Caucasus, ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/L169-8.7.2003.pdf (accessed in 3/2006). 
97  This view was still expressed by members of the EC in interviews held by the author in Brussels in May 
2006. 
98 Cf. Célia Chauffour/Francois Gremy, Berg-Karabkh, Südossetien, Abchasien: Einblicke ins Innere der 
europäischen Politik im Südkaukasus, 28 November 2004, in: www.caucaz.com/home_de/breve_contenu_ 
imprim.php?id=24 (accessed in 3/2006). 
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tions with Russia rather than making a clear mission statement”99. The decision to appoint 
an EUSR for the South Caucasus can be interpreted as a reaction to the Member States’ 
emerging awareness that an EU policy might be more promising in questions that na-
tional policies have so far not been able to solve. But still, the EUSR’s mandate represents 
a compromise: The first EUSR, Talvitie, other than his successor (see below), did not have 
an office in Brussels, but was based in Helsinki, and had only limited resources and little 
technical support at his disposal. Furthermore, Talvitie was predominately funded by 
Finland. However, rising from tensions among the Member States concerning the possi-
bility of an EU operation, monitoring the Russian-Georgian border after the OSCE Bor-
der Monitoring Operation (BMO) had been closed due to a Russian veto in December 
2004, the EUSR team was strengthened as a compromise. What is more, just before 
Talvitie was succeeded by Swedish diplomat and former Head of the OSCE Mission to 
Croatia between 2002 and 2005, Peter Semneby, in February 2006100, the Council reviewed 
the EUSR mandate, providing for a stronger political role with a focus on the conflicts.101 
While the EUSR’s original task was to “assist in conflict resolution, in particular to enable 
the EU to better support the United Nations [and…] the OSCE”102, with the strengthened 
mandate he can “contribute to the settlement of conflicts and […] facilitate the implemen-
tation with the United Nations [and…] the [OSCE]”103. 
Increased EU Activities after the ‘Rose Revolution’ of November 2003 
The European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, seizes the account of fragile 
statehood representing a threat to international security. The Strategy defines state failure 
as “an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional 
instability“104 and considers it to be one of the “key threats”, the others being terrorism, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organized 
crime.105. It also states that the EU “should take a stronger and more active interest in the 
problems of the South Caucasus”106, which are at large congruent with the mentioned key 
threats. While earlier documents on the EU’s policies towards its neighbors had only ad-
dressed Russia, the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS), and the southern adjoin-
ing states of the Mediterranean107, explicitly ruling out the South Caucasus countries108, the 
 
 
99 Xymena Kurowska, Beyond the Balkans but Still in Civilian Uniform: EUJUST THEMIS to Georgia, in: 
CFSP Forum 4 (3), May 2006, p. 8-11, p. 8. 
100 Cf. Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP, OJ L 49 of 21.2.2006. 
101 Cf. Lynch 2006, see above (footnote 55), p. 65 f. 
102 Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP, see above (footnote 96), Art. 3(d), p. 74 [emphasis added; P.J.]. 
103 Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP, see above (footnote 100), Art. 3(d), p. 15 [emphasis added; P.J.]. 
104 Council of the European Union 2003, see above (footnote 3), p. 4. 
105 Cf. ibid., see above (footnote 3), pp. 3-5. 
106 Ibid., see above (footnote 3), p. 8. 
107 Cf. i.a. European Commission, Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, Brussels, 1 July 
2003, in: www.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_393_en.pdf (accessed in 3/2006). 
108 A footnote in a communication from the Commission states: “Given their location, the Southern Caucasus 
therefore also fall outside the geographical scope of this initiative for the time being.” European Commis-
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‘Rose Revolution’ of November 2003 in Georgia drew international attention to the re-
gion and gave rise to hopes for an advance of the democratization processes. 
Following the ‘Rose Revolution’, the EU provided immediate support for the Georgian 
presidential and repeat parliamentary elections in January and March 2004 through the 
“Rapid Reaction Mechanism” (RRM). The EC also co-chaired, together with the World 
Bank, an international donors conference in June 2004, which pledged to Georgia a total 
of 850 million euro for the period 2004 to 2006. Compared with the period 2001 to 2003, 
the EC doubled assistance to Georgia. The EU also stepped up its role in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and, by 2005, had become “the largest donor and the most comprehensively 
engaged”109 in both conflict zones. 
In relation to the South Ossetia conflict, the EU has implemented three phases of a re-
habilitation program with a total of 7.5 million euro since 1998. The third phase consists 
of 2.5 million euro to rehabilitate basic infrastructures (e.g. gas and water distribution in 
Tskhinvali, local waste management and school renovation projects) and has been con-
tinued in 2006. This follows earlier phases that focused on the rehabilitation of the drink-
able water supply network, parts of the electricity network, schools, and the railway link 
between Gori-Tskhinvali. The EU has been more directly engaged in resolving conflict in 
South Ossetia than in Abkhazia. In exchange for agreeing to negotiate with the four sides 
of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) on how the EC’s money will be used, the EC par-
ticipates in negotiations – first at the Economic Working Groups and, since 2001, at the 
JCC. Grants to the OSCE Mission to Georgia, totaling 500,000 euro, are used to finance 
the JCC.110 But as in Abkhazia, the EU is seen as supporting the OSCE rather than taking 
on its own political role. Furthermore, EU projects in the conflict zone have focused 
mainly on infrastructure rehabilitation rather than traditional confidence-building. The 
EU has not funded projects with civil society, youth, media, women and former combat-
ants.111
In Abkhazia, EU involvement included seven projects: (1) the EC launched an eco-
nomic rehabilitation program (4 million euro) in two phases in 2005 and 2006 in order to 
improve conditions in western Georgia and regions inside Abkhazia (Gali, Ochamchire, 
Tkvarcheli and Zugdidi); (2) the EU supported de-mining activities in Abkhazia; (3) in 
order to rehabilitate the Enguri Hydropower Plant, a vital electricity provider for all of 
western Georgia, the EC provided some 9 million euro; (4) ECHO continued its humani-
tarian relief programs in Abkhazia and Georgia proper with a focus on health and agricul-
tural projects; (5) the EC’s RRM assisted in confidence-building activities of international 
NGOs; (6) the EC launched micro-projects to support NGOs in the separatist region in 
 
 
 
sion, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours, Brussels, 11 March 2003, in: www.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en. pdf (accessed 
in 3/2006), p. 4. 
109 Lynch 2006, see above (footnote 55), p. 64. 
110 Cf. International Crisis Group 2006, see above (footnote 21), p. 20. 
111 Cf. ibid., p. 21. 
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2005, funded from the EIDHR; (7) the EU has supported rehabilitation efforts in Suk-
humi and western Abkhazia through the Decentralized Cooperation Mechanism.112 Al-
though the EU had become the largest donor in Abkhazia by mid-2006, implementing 
projects worth some 25 million euro, “[t]he EU risks working around rather than directly 
on conflict”113 No substantial work has been done on security sector reform in Abkhazia, 
arms proliferation and reintegration of combatants, or improving rule of law through 
policing projects. 
Furthermore, after the ‘Rose Revolution’, the idea of an ESDP mission to Georgia 
arose when the Estonian Permanent Representation to the EU first formulated it in De-
cember 2003 – initially with the large scope of an integrated civil administration. In Feb-
ruary 2004, a Lithuanian representative presented the initiative to the “Committee on the 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management” (CIVCOM)114. The Council Secretariat, specifi-
cally DGE IX, supported the idea and deployed an exploratory mission to Georgia in 
March 2004, although some Member States considered it unnecessarily irritant towards 
Russia. The recommendations included incorporating the penitentiary system, which the 
fact-finding mission, dispatched in May 2004, indeed did. This resulted in a dispute with 
the EC that was already running a penitentiary project in Georgia. Nevertheless, with EU-
JUST THEMIS the EU deployed its first rule of law ESDP mission between July 2004 and 
July 2005.115 In order to support the implementation of the resulting draft reform strategy 
after the termination of THEMIS, two former THEMIS experts were placed in the en-
hanced EUSR team until February 2006. Following a Georgian initiative, the draft crimi-
nal law reform implementation plan has been included in the ENP Action Plan formally 
approved on November 14 (see below, page 28).116
Since 2004: The European Neighborhood Policy 
As the South Caucasus, with the latest enlargement by ten new Member States in May 
2004, geographically approached Europe’s borders, the EC strategy paper on the ENP of 
May 2004 also includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as “certain other countries 
within the proximity of the enlarged EU”117, along with Belarus and Libya. On the basis of 
this strategy paper, the Council decided to include the three states in the ENP in June 
 
 
112 Cf. Lynch 2006, see above (footnote 55), p. 64. 
113 International Crisis Group 2006, see above (footnote 21), p. 19. 
114 CIVCOM was created under the Treaty of Nice. It is responsible for the civilian aspects of the ESDP and 
develops civilian projects aimed at the realization of the EU’s goals of civilian crisis management. Further-
more, CIVCOM coordinates the deployment of police forces, judicial officers and other non-military spe-
cialists. 
115 For more details on the decision-making and implementation processes cf. Kurowska 2006, see above 
(footnote 99). 
116  Cf. EU/Georgia Action Plan, in: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 
(accessed in 11/2006), p. 4 
117 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12 May 2004, in:  
www.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/strategy/Strategy_Paper_EN.pdf (accessed in 3/2006), p. 10. 
 
Europe’s New Neighborhood On The Verge Of War 27
 
2004, “opening up the prospect of a significantly enhanced partnership and thus marking 
an important step forward in the EU’s engagement with the Southern Caucasus region”118. 
The ENP is supposed to provide a framework for EU relations with these states with-
out offering the perspective of accession. The major goals “to reduce poverty and create 
an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration, intensified 
political and cultural relations, enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsi-
bility for conflict prevention”119 are supposed to be achieved in several steps, e.g. the de-
velopment of Country Reports and Action Plans in order to give consideration to the 
affected countries’ diversity, and the introduction of the European Neighborhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007, replacing previous financial instruments like 
TACIS or the EIDHR.120 The EU has pledged that successful fulfillment of the Action Plan 
can lead to further development of bilateral relations, including new contractual links in 
the shape of European Neighborhood Agreements.121 It has to be noted that the Action 
Plans are not legal agreements – the PCAs, therefore, remain the key frameworks defining 
bilateral relations. 
The Country Report for Georgia – as well as for Armenia and Azerbaijan – was 
adopted early in March 2005. Due to protests on the part of new EU Member State Cy-
prus against Azerbaijani direct flights to Northern Cyprus, the EU was not ready to start 
consultations on the Action Plan before late 2005 instead of the summer.122 The EC has 
made some recommendations to the Council in regard to the Action Plan, including the 
provision for strengthened political dialogue; further implementation of the PCA; support 
for market economy reforms; further support for economic rehabilitation of conflict 
zones; increased financial support; enhanced support for regional cooperation; enhanced 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs possibly including establishment of a 
dialogue on visa cooperation; intensification of cooperation in the energy, electronic 
communications and transport, environment and public health sectors; intensification of 
people-to-people contacts.123  
The reference to conflict resolution in these recommendations has been rather restric-
tive, stating that Action Plans should offer “further support for economic rehabilitation of 
the conflict zones in the context of conflict settlement”124. After two rounds of consulta-
 
 
118 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy - Recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and for Egypt and Lebanon, Brussels, 2 March 2005, in: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/ 
pdf/enp_communication_72_2005_en.pdf (accessed in 3/2006), p. 2. 
119 European Commission 2003, see above (footnote 108), p. 9. 
120 See European Commission, Thematic Programme for the promotion of democracy and human rights 
worldwide under the future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013). 
121 Cf. European Commission 2004, see above (footnote 117), pp. 3-4. 
122 Cf. Walter Kaufmann, European Neighbourhood Policy in the South Caucasus, in: Heinrich Böll Founda-
tion EU Regional Office Brussels (ed.) 2005, On the outside looking in: Perceptions of European Foreign 
and Security Policy in neighbouring countries, Brussels 2005, p. 13-14, here: 14. 
123 Cf. European Commission, see above (footnote 118). 
124 European Commission 2005, see above (footnote 118), p. 6. 
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tions in November 2005 and March 2006, Georgian sources expressed frustration that the 
EU was unwilling to incorporate more conflict resolution commitments in the Action 
Plan text.125 Tbilisi would like to see the EU’s economic rehabilitation assistance in the 
conflict zones supplemented by greater political and military security-related engagement, 
especially regarding EU commitment vis-à-vis Russia. However, the EU is more interested 
in supporting current UN and OSCE negotiation efforts126 and considers the promotion of 
European values as an indirect means to contribute to conflict resolution by helping to 
create a Georgian state that could be more attractive to South Ossetia and Abkhazia than 
independence or closer integration with Russia. Nevertheless, the Action Plan, which was 
finally adopted on November 14127, has included the promotion of the peaceful resolution 
of internal conflicts as “priority area 6”. This, among others, refers to enhanced efforts in 
confidence-building, the consideration of further economic assistance in the light of pro-
gress in the conflict settlement progress, the active contribution to accelerating the process 
of demilitarization and of conflict resolution, and the inclusion of the issue of Georgia’s 
territorial integrity and the settlement of her internal conflicts in EU-Russia political dia-
logue meetings.128
3.3 Intermediate Conclusion 
The EU policies towards post-Soviet transformation countries have been nothing more 
than “explorative, reactionary, and evolutionary steps”129 during the 1990s. The EU has 
been reluctant to take an active political role in Russia’s periphery due to special relations 
with Moscow at the (Member States’) national level. The EU has been slow in differentiat-
ing the former Soviet Union – early instruments of assistance, such as TACIS, were aimed 
at the whole CIS area. The EU has lacked a strategy towards the region: “[...] if by strategy 
we mean a coherent relationship between ends and means, there is no EU strategy in the 
Caucasus”130, and has rather been led by events. 
Until recent developments, like 11 September 2001, that strengthened the security 
paradigm, the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, and the 
Eastern enlargement in May 2004, the EU’s interests in the region have been dominated 
by economic and energy-related issues. The political dimension in external relations – 
apart from enlargement – has become a major objective for the EU relatively late. By 2001, 
 
 
125 According to interviews conducted by the International Crisis Group with an official of the Georgian min-
istry of foreign affairs in Tbilisi in March 2006; cf. (also for the following) International Crisis Group 2006, 
see above (footnote 21), pp. 9 f. 
126 This was expressed by members of the EC in interviews held in Brussels on 3 May 2006. 
127 In interviews held in Brussels in early May, members of the EC, participating in the consultations, had 
expressed their hopes that the Action Plan text would be agreed upon in the subsequent third round of con-
sultations in mid-May. 
128  Cf. EU/Georgia Action Plan, see above (footnote 116), p. 10. 
129 Cf. i.a. Fischer 2006, see above (footnote 81), p. 145. 
130 MacFarlane 2004, see above (footnote 62), p. 132. 
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it became evident that the conflicts would have to be addressed as part of the PCA proc-
ess131 – after all, Brussels had emphasized the primary importance of conflict settlement for 
external assistance to be effective in the South Caucasus since 1999132. This, however, did 
not translate into immediate adjustment of existing or the creation of new instruments. In 
fact, even after the European Security Strategy had directed attention to the region and an 
EU Special Representative had been appointed in the summer of 2003, without the trig-
gering factor of the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 
probably would not have been incorporated into the ENP – a decision that still followed 
lengthy internal debates within the Council and the EC. And without the ‘Rose Revolu-
tion’, the EU would probably not have significantly increased financial contributions to 
conflict resolution in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Therefore, the EU did become more engaged in the two secession conflicts – however, 
not resulting from its own assessments of the importance of conflict settlement in 1999, 
but rather led by events since 2003. But still, with the stability of the South Caucasus be-
coming a clear EU interest, the EU seems to be willing to take a more active political role, 
which is reflected in the appointment of an EUSR and, particularly in Georgia, where the 
structure of resonance is more open to the EU compared to Armenia or Azerbaijan, the 
employment of the RRM and the launching of an ESDP mission. However, this ‘willing-
ness’ has some restrictions. Despite identifying the primary importance of conflict settle-
ment, the EU emphasizes it is not willing to get directly involved in the negotiation proc-
esses and is only ready to provide the funds for confidence-building in support of UN- 
and OSCE-led negotiations or for reconstruction assistance after a peace deal.133 EU pro-
jects in the conflict zones have focused mainly on infrastructure rehabilitation rather than 
traditional confidence-building. The EU’s reluctance to get directly involved can, amongst 
other things, be explained by the fact that Russia is a more important strategic partner for 
most Member States than Georgia. Brussels follows a soft power approach regarding the 
conflicts and believes that assisting Georgia in becoming a well-governed state could make 
it more attractive to the breakaway regions than closer integration with the Russian Fed-
eration. Effectiveness of conditionality and the promotion of the EU’s values have been 
limited so far due to a lack of strong incentives such as EU accession. Although the poten-
tial of the Action Plans to promote conflict resolution has not been fully exploited, there is 
a chance for the EU to enhance and reposition itself in the South Caucasus.134 So what role 
should the EU play in Georgia? 
 
 
131 Cf. General Affairs Council Conclusions, Brussels, 26-27 February 2001; also see below, page 15 ff. 
132 Cf. General Affairs Council, 21-22 June 1999, Press 198 No. 9008/99 as well as Dov Lynch, Security Sector 
Governance in the Southern Caucasus – Towards an EU Strategy, in: Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (ed.), Security Sector Governance in the Southern Caucasus: Challenges 
and Visions, Geneva (DCAF), 2004, pp. 34-47, here: 42. 
133 This view was expressed by representatives of the EC in interviews held in Brussels on 3 May 2006. 
134 Cf. IntLynernational Crisis Group 2006, see above (footnote 21), p. 8. 
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4. Conclusion: What Role for the EU in Georgia? 
As the recent crisis between Georgia and Russia has shown, as well as the alarming escala-
tion of the South Ossetian conflict in the summer of 2004, the EU may find itself con-
fronted with wars among its neighbors or within its new neighborhood sooner than it 
would like to imagine. Brussels’ threefold normative, economic and security-related inter-
ests in Georgia are at stake. Therefore, it is necessary to assess how the EU can best attend 
to its interests. 
Against the background of the EU’s image as an ‘honest broker’ free from traditional 
US-Russia rivalries as well as the failure of UN- and OSCE-led negotiation mechanisms, at 
least with regard to producing final settlements, the EU appears well-suited for the task of 
conflict resolution. And as shown, Europe does have important interests in Georgia, espe-
cially concerning the avoidance of instability on its borders. But actually, it cannot be in 
Brussels’ interest to get directly involved in the negotiation processes in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. The nature of these two secession conflicts is ‘frozen’ with hardly any chance of 
becoming ‘unfrozen’ in the near future (except from the danger of being ‘unfreezed’ by 
escalating into hot wars). Trying to ‘unfreeze’ them in the short-term is as yet an unob-
tainable goal and, therefore, the wrong strategy. This is true not only for Saakashvili’s 
strategy of trying to quickly reintegrate the breakaway regions, but also for the EU’s own 
assessment that external assistance can only be effective if the conflicts are solved. So why 
should the EU take a stronger role in conflict resolution? Because Georgia has asked for it? 
Because the UN- and OSCE-led negotiation mechanisms are ‘blocked’ by Russia? 
So far Saakashvili has not paid a lot of attention to Europe, given his close relations 
with the USA. He has applied a strategy of provoking Russia in order to trigger a strong 
reaction, thereby gaining ‘Western’ solidarity. Since Washington has distanced itself from 
Georgia to some extent, lately, there is now a chance to abate Saakashvili’s risky approach 
in order to take a more considerate, constructive line. Instead of getting entangled in 
something that might undermine a strong strategic interest of the EU and its Member 
States, i.e. maintaining good relations with Russia, at this point, Brussels could use these 
relations, its efforts to develop a ‘strategic partnership’ and its neutral image to promote 
dialogue between Tbilisi and Moscow. Furthermore, the EU has already successfully man-
aged to become the largest and most comprehensively engaged donor in both conflict 
zones without direct engagement. So what should be wrong with the EU’s approach of 
(financially) supporting UN and OSCE efforts instead of getting directly involved? Brus-
sels itself has stressed the point that other external actors are directly engaged in conflict 
resolution. And what would be the specific added value of an EU engagement? It is unre-
alistic that a direct EU involvement in the negotiation processes would change anything 
that could not have been changed before. Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that the 
EU has more pressing issues on its foreign policy and, after the French and Dutch refer-
enda, internal agenda. Thus, it is not in the EU’s interest to enhance its direct role in con-
flict resolution. 
But in order to pursue its interests, the EU should enhance the role that has evolved in 
recent years. Thus, Brussels should not create new instruments, but apply the instruments 
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already at its disposal more coherently. The EUSR’s mandate has already been strength-
ened in order to give him a more active political role. It should be further strengthened, 
especially with regard to his visible presence in the region. The ENP has been developed 
with the aim of avoiding instability on the EU’s borders, as formulated in the European 
Security Strategy, by seeking a ring of well-governed countries around it. Brussels should 
concentrate on good governance and rely on its soft power approach of assisting Georgia 
in becoming a well-governed state that would be more attractive to South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia than closer integration with the Russian Federation. After all, the key threat of 
state failure, identified by the Security Strategy, not only consists of intrastate conflicts 
and the lack of control over a country’s territory, but also of weak institutions. Moreover, 
in Georgia the interconnectedness of the secession conflicts, organized crime, weak insti-
tutions, a lack of the rule of law, and corruption constitute a vicious circle – a vicious cir-
cle that the EU could help break by strengthening the Georgian state, engaging in institu-
tion- and capacity-building and promoting good governance in general. This would also, 
to a certain degree, steal Saakashvili’s thunder of holding the ‘frozen’ conflicts responsible 
for slow progress in the reform process. Brussels should convey to Saakashvili that the 
conflicts are not an ultimate obstacle to progress in the democratization process, that 
finding a short-term solution for them is impossible, that provocations and pressure hold 
the risk of escalating them to hot wars, that a reasonable long-term strategy requires con-
fidence-building, a task that both the OSCE and the UN are engaged in, and, finally, that a 
more democratic and prosperous Georgian central state would be more attractive to the 
breakaway regions, something that the EU can help Tbilisi to achieve. After the 2004/2005 
ESDP rule of law mission, Brussels should especially build on this aspect of good govern-
ance and has included some important benchmarks in the ENP Action Plan in this regard. 
After all, the rule of law represents “the center of gravity of state consolidation, conflict 
settlement and economic development”135. Since governance will also be a focus of the 
German Council Presidency in the first half of 2007, Berlin could add momentum to this 
soft approach and tie in with previous Council Presidencies that have given priority to the 
South Caucasus. 
 
 
135 ch 2004, see above (footnote 19), p. 46. 
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List of Abbreviations 
BMO OSCE Border Monitoring Operation 
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
BTE Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CoE Council of Europe 
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSP Country Strategy Paper 
DG Relex European Commission External Relations Directorate-General 
EC European Commission 
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office 
EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
ENP European Neighborhood Policy 
ENPI European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument 
EP European Parliament 
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy 
EU European Union 
EUSR European Union Special Representative 
GOF Global Opportunities Fund of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
GTEP US Georgian Train and Equip Program 
ICG International Crisis Group 
IFSH Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik 
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe 
JCC Joint Control Commission 
JPKF Joint Peace Keeping Forces 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PRIF Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 
RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
SSOP US Sustainment and Stability Operations Program 
SSR Soviet Socialist Republic 
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission to Georgia 
 
 Appendix: Map of Georgia 
Map printed by courtesy of the International Crisis Group, Brussels.  
 
